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Policy Messages:  Procuring food aid supplies locally and regionally can save lives by improving the 
timeliness and reducing the cost of food aid delivery. 
•  Experience with local/regional procurement (LRP) in Africa has demonstrated significant cost 
savings compared to in-kind food aid;  
•  World Food Program (WFP) experience in Africa shows that LRP can be efficient relative to both 
local and international prices, and can be designed to have minimal disruptive effects on local 
markets while providing an important additional outlet for marketed surplus;  
•  A wide range of procurement modalities, each potentially appropriate under different circumstances, 
are available.  For example, donors can and do rely upon WFP to carry out the local procurement.  
WFP can allow quick start-up to procurement activities, and may be cost effective (relative to other 
LRP modalities) when large quantities are needed, but is relatively inflexible as it is obliged to follow 
its own established procedures.  Reliance on NGOs may require greater local monitoring by the 
donor, but can offer greater flexibility, since NGOs may be able to procure and distribute (smaller 
quantities) more quickly than could WFP or a commercial buying agent  
 
PURPOSE: This Policy Synthesis is a summary 
of a longer report that discusses the procurement 
of food aid within the country or region where it 
is needed.  Referred to as local and regional 
procurement – LRP – this practice has become a 
major element in multilateral food aid response 
over the past decade
1.  The paper examines the 
relevance and the rationale for using LRP, 
reviews the efficiency of World Food Program 
(WFP) LRP activities in Africa relative to in-
kind food aid and to prices in the markets in 
which it occurs, and proposes a classification of 
risks in LRP.  It then discusses a range of 
potential LRP modalities, and proposes a 
                                                 
1   “Local” refers to purchases within the recipient 
country, while “regional” refers to purchases in a 
neighboring country, for example, purchases in South 
Africa for delivery to Zimbabwe. 
framework of guiding principles, information 
systems, and operational procedures for 
responsible and effective LRP. Finally, the paper 
briefly discusses the implications of this 
research for expansion of U.S. government 
(USG) authority to engage in LRP.   
 
REVIEW OF LRP PRACTICE:   WFP 
conducts 75%-80% of all LRP in Africa and 
maintains an organized data base that facilitates 
analysis; we focus on their activities for these 
reasons.  From 1999 to 2005, the value of LRP 
by WFP in all developing countries quadrupled, 
and the share of developing countries in total 
procurement rose to nearly 75% (Figure 1).  The 
share of LRP in total food aid also rose, to about 
22% in Africa in 2004/05.  This rise in global 
procurement was linked primarily to changes in  
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European food aid and development policy, 
followed in late 2005 by a Canadian decision to 
use up to 50% of its food aid budget for 
purchases in developing countries.  
 
Figure 1.  World Food Program Worldwide Food 
Aid Procurement, 1999-2005 (US$m) 
 
Maize dominates LRP in Africa, with a 60% 
share in 2005.  Blended food now ranks second, 
after rising by more than four times in the 
continent since 2001.  Food aid flows within and 
between countries of Africa tripled between 
2001 and 2005; of the food aid crossing borders 
within the continent, nearly 60% came from 
South Africa.  The rest remains heavily 
concentrated in Southern and Eastern Africa, 
with Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Sudan, and Kenya leading the way (Figure 2).   
 
In all African countries except Uganda, WFP 
LRP of maize averaged less than 5% of 
production and less than 9% of maize marketed 
surplus from 2001 to 2005.  In Uganda, WFP 
maize procurement averaged about 10% of 
production and 12% of marketed surplus during 
the period, and may have exceeded 20% of 
marketed surplus in 2005.  Procurement appears 
to have reached or exceeded 10% of marketed 
surplus in Zambia each year from 2003 to 2005 
and in Tanzania in 2003 and 2005.  In most 
countries during most years, pressure on local 
prices from LRP has likely been minimal; 
however, this issue requires more careful 
analysis, especially in the largest LRP countries 
and in less developed markets such as for dry 
beans (though data limitations may preclude 
quantitative analysis of the latter). 
 
EFFICIENCY OF LRP:  Previous research has 
shown that the cost savings of LRP relative to 
in-kind food aid are greatest for the two main 
commodities shipped by USG to Africa: the unit 
cost of locally procured maize and corn/soy 
blend (CSB) was 61% and 52%, respectively, 
that of in-kind food aid (regardless of source)
2.  
Our analysis compared the procurement cost of 
maize grain by WFP in Kenya, Uganda, and 
Zambia between 2001 and 2005, with estimated 
costs of food aid from the U.S.  Results strongly 
reinforce previous findings: using LRP rather 
than in-kind donations of maize saved nearly 
US$68m, and allowed 75% more food aid to be 
provided to beneficiaries.   
 
Figure 2.  Location of Food Aid Procurement by 















Analysis of the efficiency of WFP LRP activities 
in Africa relative to local market prices paints a 
generally favorable picture: the agency has 
consistently paid competitive prices in Zambia 
and has done so in Uganda since late 2004, 
while paying about a 10% premium in Kenya.  
In all countries, WFP has switched away from 
local procurement when local prices exceeded 
                                                 
2  Clay, E., B. Riley and I. Urey (2004).  The 
Development Effectiveness of Food Aid: Does Tying 
Matter?  OECD.   
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import parity.  The main potential improvement 
regards the seasonality of purchases; throughout 
Africa, these tend to be concentrated in months 
of low or falling supply and high or rising 
prices.  Flexible financing mechanisms are 
crucial to improving this performance.   
 
MANAGING RISKS:  Any food aid operation 
entails risks.  Frequently cited risks attending 
traditional in-kind food aid are that it may 
reduce production and trade incentives and 
breed dependency in the recipient country, or 
that it may arrive too late, endangering human 
lives.  Regarding LRP, the paper distinguishes 
between First Order Risks, which can be defined 
with some precision and are relevant to 
managers for every transaction, and Second 
Order Risks, which are less precisely defined, 
are not specific to any given transaction, and 
have consequences that are likely to be less 
serious or less easily established than those of 
first order risks.  First order risks include (1) that 
procurement will push local prices above import 
parity levels or above historical norms, (2) that 
traders will default on tenders, thus endangering 
the food aid pipeline, and (3) that procured food 
will fail to meet minimum safety standards, e.g., 
for aflatoxin contamination in maize.   
 
Evidence from WFP’s activities in Africa 
suggest that it has effectively managed default 
and food safety risks through pre-qualification 
of traders and by using contracting conditions 
that penalize traders for default.  We know of no 
instances of food safety breaches in WFP 
procured food; although trader default has 
occurred, we found no pattern of food aid 
pipelines being disrupted by these events.  Some 
evidence, though inconclusive, suggests that 
LRP may have contributed to price surges (risk 
1) in Uganda in 2003 and in Niger and Ethiopia 
in 2005/06.  In general, the concentration of 
purchases during scarce periods in most 
countries increases the likelihood of price 
spikes.  Given the importance of the issue, and 
the analytical difficulty of attributing price 
effects to any one cause, this risk deserves 
further analytical attention. 
 
Second order risks relate primarily to medium- 
to long-term developmental effects of LRP, such 
as creating price instability or an unsustainable 
market, and artificially strengthening some 
traders at the expense of others. On balance, we 
conclude that second order risks can be 
effectively managed through careful selection of 
traders, competitive tenders, and proper contract 
specifications.  Yet  all these risks increase with 
the share of LRP in a market; when procurement 
exceeds 10% of marketed surplus, tendering and 
contracting procedures must be especially well 
designed and executed. 
 
Overall, the analysis suggests that, by learning 
from WFP’s experience, donors can design local 
and regional food aid procurement programs that 
effectively balance the risks of LRP and 
maximize the desired advantages of timeliness 
and cost effectiveness.   
 
LRP MODALITIES: Donors considering LRP 
can choose from a range of modalities.  We 
assess several possibilities based on their likely 
cost, flexibility, and ability to economize on 
scarce analytical and managerial resources.   
 
• Working through WFP would allow the 
quickest start-up, require the least monitoring 
by the donor, and could result in the lowest 
total cost (among LRP modalities) in large-
scale operations.  Long-run effectiveness 
depends in part on WFP’s overhead and other 
charges.  This modality would be less flexible 
than some, being most effective for acquiring 
large volumes when needs are known 6-8 
weeks in advance.   
 
• Contracting a commercial agent (either a 
local trader or international grain trading firm) 
could, in principle, yield cost savings over 
working with WFP; realizing these savings, 
however, would not be automatic. This 
approach would require more donor analytical 
and operational resources and may not be 
more flexible than working through WFP.   
 
• Working through NGOs.  NGOs have done 
less food aid procurement than WFP.  The 
limited empirical record suggests that they 
have at times paid well above market prices 
for some products.  Procurement by multiple 
NGOs would require greater donor monitoring  
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to assure consistency of procedures and 
evaluation of prices paid.  The potential payoff 
would be greater flexibility, since NGOs may 
be able to procure and distribute smaller 
quantities more quickly than could WFP or a 
commercial buying agent.  One would also 
expect NGOs’ price performance to improve 
as volumes and experience increase. 
 
• Umbrella procurement on behalf of NGOs, 
modeled on EU Humanitarian Procurement 
Centers, could improve the procurement cost 
performance of NGOs and reduce analytical 
and operational demands on the local donor 
office, while maintaining the flexibility 
advantages of working with NGOs. 
 
• Procurement by affected households allows 
these households to do their own procurement 
by putting purchasing power in their hands in 
the form of food vouchers or cash.  Potential 
advantages of this approach are reduced 
logistics costs for the donor and greater 
efficiency in converting donor financial 
resources into food or other necessities 
delivered to affected households in a crisis.   
 
TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR LRP 
PRACTICE:  The overall guiding principle for 
LRP is to save lives and do no harm.  Saving 
lives requires that LRP be used whenever it will 
allow more timely delivery of aid to threatened 
populations, or when it will allow more 
assistance to be delivered to more people among 
a threatened population.  Two additional 
proposed guiding principles are that LRP’s costs 
be evaluated on the basis of full cost accounting, 
and that any explicitly developmental goals of 
LRP be pursued in a way that does not 
compromise cost efficiency and timeliness.  
 
Elements of a proposed Food Aid Procurement 
Information System (FAPIS) to minimize the 
risk of price spikes are (1) a baseline of selected 
price and household level analysis, to be fully 
updated every three- to five years, (2) regular 
partial updates of the baseline (from monthly to 
yearly, depending on the data), and (3) 
comparison of local prices to import parity (to 
be done prior to every LRP transaction).  A well 
functioning local market information system will 
help immensely in implementing and evaluating 
an LRP program. 
 
Operational procedures need to focus on default 
and food safety risks and, to the extent possible, 
on second order risks.  Specific procedures will 
vary depending on the procurement modality 
selected.  Key issues are how to screen and 
contract with traders, developing contingency 
plans, reducing price risk, deciding whether to 
accept a price bid, and coordinating with 
government and other donors. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR USG: USG is the 
largest global food aid donor.  The majority of 
USG donated food is purchased under 
competitive tender in the U.S. and shipped to the 
recipient country on U.S. flag carriers.  To meet 
sudden emergencies, supplies can be drawn from 
pre-positioned stocks of U.S. food aid, or 
supplies on the sea can be diverted to a more 
critical destination.  Though costly, this 
approach has delivered vast amounts of food to 
tens of millions of needy people over the past 50 
years.  Yet commodities purchased and shipped 
from the US can take months to arrive, pre-
positioned stocks are not always available, and 
their full cost has not been analyzed.  In light of 
these facts, and of mounting emergency food aid 
needs, the flexibility to complement on-going in-
kind food aid operations by purchasing some 
food aid locally is under review by the U.S. 
government.  The analysis summarized in this 
paper suggests that properly designed LRP could 
be a lower cost, life-saving option compared to 
in-kind food aid, allowing food relief to be 
delivered to more beneficiaries within weeks 
rather than months.   
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